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The High- 'akes Battle Over Whether the Courts,
Congress or the FEC Should Muzzle Independent
"527" Television Advertising
[ By Christopher G. lohnson*i
ohn Kerry lied to get his Bronze
Star. I know, I was there-I saw
what happened."1
"George Bush misled us
into war with Iraq."
2
"John Kerry secretly met
with enemy leaders in Paris-
though we were still at war."3
"We were given these ideas
that there were weapons of mass de-
struction.... It was just a lie, and it
Those who closely followed the 2004
presidential election are familiar with the
firestorm surrounding these controversial tele-
vision ads. Last year's political advertising
brouhaha set the stage for the current, no-
holds-barred battle over whether organiza-
tions claiming tax exempt status under 26
U.S.C. § 527 ("527's") should be allowed to
exist in their present incarnation. Behind the
scenes, heavyweight Washington insiders are
now brawling over whether Congress, the
"The 527 debate boils down
to two things: money and
power.
wasn't a proper use of American
troops."4
"John Kerry betrayed the
men and women he served with in
Vietnam."
5
"George Bush used his fa-
ther to get into the National Guard,
was grounded and then went miss-
"6
ing.
courts, or the Federal Election Commission
("FEC") should require 527s to register as
"political committees" and abide by soft
money restrictions.7 The outcome of this high-
stakes debate could shift the balance of politi-
cal power and dramatically affect how groups
and individuals spend a substantial amount




The 527 debate boils down to two things:
money and power. To fully understand the
motives of the players in the current 527 con-
test, one must recall how the dispute reached
its current boiling point. During the 2004 elec-
tion cycle, independent 527's such as Swift Boat
Veterans For Truth ("SBVFT"), MoveOn.org, and
Media Fund burst onto the scene in the wake of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA")
and almost instantly became powerful players
in the biggest political contest in decades.' Tele-
vision stations in battleground states found
themselves swimming in money as 527's poured
more than a half-billion dollars into the 2004
presidential campaign 9 and spent over $146 mil-
lion on advertising. 0 Moreover, according to a
post-election survey in battleground states, two
of the three most influential 2004 presidential
campaign commercials were produced by
527's.11
At different points during the 2004 cam-
paign, both Republicans and Democrats cried
foul over the broadcast of specific 527 ads, de-
pending on whose ox was being gored at the
time. For example, the Chairmen of both the
Republican National Committee ("RNC") and
the Democrat National Committee ("DNC")
wrote letters to television stations urging them
to refrain from broadcasting certain 527 ads.'
2
Furthermore, both the Bush and Kerry Cam-
paigns filed complaints with the Federal Elec-
tion Commission ("FEC") alleging 527 cam-
paign finance violations.'
3
As the 527 battle rages, pending court
cases 14 or proposed legislation 15 could force the
FEC to tighten regulatory clamps on loose, free-
wheeling 527's. However, if left unregulated
and unstopped by the courts, 527 television
advertising will snowball during future election
cycles.
16
This Note analyzes possible FEC actions,
pending court decisions, and proposed legisla-
tion that could once again dramatically change
the landscape of political advertising. Section I
of this Note examines the BCRA and the Su-
preme Court's subsequent ruling in McConnell
v. FEC that created the environment that caused
527's to flourish. Section II focuses on FEC en-
forcement of campaign finance laws and ex-
amines a pending court case considering
whether the FEC acted arbitrarily by failing to
require all 527's to register as political commit-
tees. Section III considers whether courts or law-
makers should require 527's to register as po-
litical committees in light of the plain lan-
guage of campaign finance laws, Supreme
Court cases, and policy considerations. Sec-
tion IV suggests a course of action.
I. Unintended Consequences
Section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code, the legal vehicle enabling the creation of
527's, became law in 1974.17 However, 527
groups existed in relative obscurity from the
media spotlight for nearly thirty years.18 At least
two major factors led to last year's 527 adver-
tising explosion. First, Congress passed the
BCRA in an attempt, inter alia, to take soft
money out of federal campaigns and thereby
enhance the public's confidence in the political
process.1 9 Second, the Supreme Court upheld
most of the BCRA, noting that Congress' inter-
est in preventing corruption-or the appear-
ance of corruption-among elected officials,
justified any free speech limits the BCRA im-
posed.2 °
A. The BCRA Changes the
Political Advertising Game
The BCRA, which amended the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1974 ("FECA"), was
the result of a hard-fought seven-year battle
waged by campaign finance reform advocates
like Senators McCain and Feingold.21 The Act,
in part, prohibits federal candidates and na-
tional parties from accepting or spending large,
unregulated campaign contributions.2 2 Re-
formers hoped the legislation would change
federal politics in at least three ways: first, by
eliminating soft money and its corrupting in-
fluence from politics;23 second, by enhancing
the public's confidence in the political system;
2 4
and third, by encouraging civility during cam-
paigns a.2  As part of the BCRA, Congress
charged the FEC with the responsibility of pro-
mulgating detailed regulations necessary to
implement and enforce the Act.
26
First, BCRA advocates hoped Title I of
the Act would limit the corrupting influence of
soft money on federal campaigns by prohibit-
ing candidates and political parties from accept-
ing or spending unauthorized funds. 27 Before
the BCRA was enacted, "soft money" was of-
-2005 486
"Bring It On"
ten defined as funds that are used for political
purposes but are unregulated by campaign fi-
nance laws.28 Prior to the BCRA's passage, na-
tional parties raised substantial amounts of soft
money from corporations, unions and wealthy
individuals. 29 Political parties used soft money
to pay for overhead expenses, run issue ads,
and support state and local party-building ac-
tivities.3 Title I of the BCRA sought to elimi-
nate the influence of soft money on federal cam-
paigns by prohibiting political candidates and
national parties' political committees from so-
liciting, receiving, directing, and spending un-
regulated funds.
31
Second, campaign reform advocates
argued that the BCRA would restore the public's
confidence in their government by avoiding the
appearance of governmental impropriety.
32
Large campaign contributions "look suspi-
ciously like bribes" when politicians grant po-
litical favors to donors.33 The BCRA sought to
fight the fire of deep-seated public mistrust in
politicians by eliminating perceived corruption
that naturally occurs when "large contributions
[facilitate] access to public officials." 34 Many
believed that taking soft money out of political
campaigns would help change the negative
public perception that elected federal officials
often auction their Congressional votes to the
highest bidder.
35
Third, lawmakers expected the Act to
increase civility in politics. The "stand by your
ad" provision was designed to discourage poli-
ticians from running attack ads by requiring
the candidates to appear in and "approve" their
commercials. 36 By making candidates take re-
sponsibility for their advertisements, reform-
ers hoped to reduce the abrasiveness, number,
and influence of negative campaign ads.37
B. McConnell Sets the Stage for
the 527 Drama
After the President signed the BCRA
into law "with reservations," 3 numerous plain-
tiffs, including Senator Mitch McConnell, filed
eleven lawsuits in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia challenging
the constitutionality of the new act. 39 The law-
suits were consolidated and considered by the
Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC.40 Under-
scoring the case's importance, the Supreme
Court cut its summer recess short to hear
McConnell.41 The Court also permitted four
hours of oral arguments, the longest period al-
lowed since a 1975 case in which the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of cam-
paign reform laws enacted shortly after
Watergate.
42
In McConnell, the Court upheld the two
main pillars of the BCRA: "the control of 'soft
money' and the regulation of electioneering
communications." 43  The Court invalidated
only two minor BCRA provisions: a ban on
political contributions accepted from minors
and a regulation requiring parties to choose
between making "independent" expenditures
or "coordinated expenditures." 44 Furthermore,
a portion of the opinion written by Justices
Stevens and O'Connor rebuked the FEC, im-
plying that BCRA regulations were necessary
because the agency, contrary to legislative in-
tent, had done a poor job of enforcing previous
campaign finance laws.
45
As a result of the BCRA and the Court's
McConnell ruling, wealthy individuals who were
barred from contributing large sums of "soft
money" to political candidates and political
parties began to fund 527's groups.46 Political
"The 'stand by your ad' provision was
designed to discourage politicians
from running attack ads by requiring
the candidates to appear in and
'approve' their commercials"
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activists, candidates, and pundits began to ask
whether the donations were legal.
1 "Money, Like Water, Will
Always Find an Outlet"47
In passing the BCRA, Congress repealed
several FEC regulations and charged the agency
with the responsibility of promulgating new
rules and definitions necessary to enforce the
law. 48 The FEC adopted regulations designed
to implement the new campaign finance laws49
and failed to enact other proposed rules. 5° The
Commission postponed a vote on a proposed
regulation that would have classified almost all
527 groups as 'political committees,' and con-
sequently would have forced the groups to com-
ply with campaign finance laws prohibiting
them from receiving large, soft money dona-
tions.51 Groups and congressmen who thought
the FEC failed to adequately regulate 527's filed
lawsuits seeking to require the FEC to vigor-
ously apply soft money restrictions to all 527's
by adjusting their regulatory definition of the
term "political committee."
52
A. The FEC Allows 527 Activity to
Pleat Up
As 527 ads took center stage during the
2004 presidential election, campaign finance
reform advocates were generally dismayed with
the FEC's unwillingness to require all 527's to
abide by soft money restrictions.53 Reformers
believed that the Commission acted in a man-
ner contrary to Congress' intent in passing cam-
paign finance legislation.5 4 Political watchdog
organizations petitioned the FEC to force 527's
to halt controversial activities and advertising.
55
Additionally, the Bush-Cheney Cam-
paign and the RNC jointly filed a complaint
56
with the FEC alleging that at least eight 527's
57
and nine individual contributors58 violated cam-
paign finance laws. 59 Republicans vehemently
argued that 527 organizations such as
MoveOn.org were political committees, and
were therefore illegally raising and spending
soft money, and unlawfully coordinating their
activities with the Democratic Party.60
The FEC didn't buy it. On May 13,
2004, a few weeks after holding hearings re-
garding whether the definition of "political com-
mittee" should apply to "nonconnected com-
mittees" such as 527's, FEC commissioners voted
to delay a decision on the matter for 90 days.61
The move shattered Republican hopes of get-
ting a timely shield to defend their presidential
candidate against the onslaught of left-leaning
527 ads and activities.
62
At the end of its 90-day extension pe-
riod, the FEC finally took a stand-of a sort.
By a vote of 4-2, the Commission adopted wa-
tered down rules designed to regulate 527s.63
However, because the rules did not go into ef-
fect until January 1, 2005, they had no notice-
able effect on the 2004 presidential election. The
new rules, moreover, failed to address the larger
issue of whether 527's are "political commit-
tees," which are regulated by campaign finance
laws.64 Ben Ginsberg, a GOP attorney who re-
signed from the Bush-Cheney campaign be-
cause of his involvement with a Republican-
leaning 527, claimed that the FEC "took a pass"
by failing to address the "political committee"
question.
65
B. The Court Battle
In September 2004, Congressmen
Shays and Meehan added their voices to a grow-
ing chorus of litigants arguing that the FEC failed
to enforce BCRA provisions by dodging the
"political committee" question.66 They filed a
lawsuit against the FEC ("Shays II')67 in the D.C.
District Court alleging that the FEC acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously by failing to sufficiently
define the term "political committee," and fail-
ing to require 527's to register as political com-
mittees.68 Oral arguments in Shays II have been
scheduled for May 12, 2005; a three-judge
panel, consisting of D.C. Court of Appeals
Judges Henderson, Edwards, and Tatel will hear
the high stakes case on an expedited basis.
69
Senators McCain and Feingold quickly
filed an amicus brief supporting their fellow
congressmen.7 The new suit was filed just days
before a D.C. District Court judge struck down
fifteen FEC regulations as a result of a separate
lawsuit (Shays I) filed two years earlier by the
same congressmen.71 The Representatives con-
tend that 527's filing as "political organizations"
with the IRS are, by their own admission, po-
litical committees, and should therefore be clas-
sified as 'political committees' and be subject
to "soft money" restrictions.72
Shays II hinges on the definition of "po-
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litical committee."73 Statutorily, the term "po-
litical committee" is defined as a group or or-
ganization which "receives contributions," or
"makes expenditures" of more than $1,000
during a calendar year.74 Contributions and
expenditures are defined as money or anything
else of value used to influence a federal elec-
tion.
75
To avoid the overreaching effect a lit-
eral interpretation of the preceding statutes
would have, 76 the Supreme Court, in 1976,
defined a political committee as an organiza-
tion that is "under the control of a candidate or
the major purpose of which is the nomination
or election of a candidate." 77 However, this
definition does not apply to "groups engaged
purely in issue discussion."78 Ten years later,
contributions totaling more than $5,000 from any
individual during any calendar year."5
Shays and Meehan argue that 527 or-
ganizations, by their very nature, are political
committees.8 6 527's register for tax-exempt sta-
tus as "political organizations" under 26 U.S.C.
527.87 The Congressmen contend that all 527's
should be required to register as political com-
mittees because, according to Internal Revenue
Code, these groups' self-declared "major pur-
pose" is to influence or attempt to influence
elections or political appointments.8 8 Shays
and Meehan argued that groups like SBVFT
and Media Fund illegally avoided the implica-
tions of the BCRA by failing to properly regis-
ter as "political committees" as required by
campaign finance laws.89 The Shays II com-
"The new rules, moreover, failed to
address the larger issue of whether
527's are "political committees,"
which are regulated by campaign
finance laws."
the Court expounded on the "major purpose
test" by stating that if an organization's "major
purpose may be regarded as a campaign activ-
ity, the corporation would be classified as a po-
litical committee." 79 Nevertheless, the FEC de-
clined to incorporate the "major purpose test"
into its definition of "political committee," al-
though the commission considers a group's
purpose as one factor in determining whether
or not the group should be classified as a politi-
cal committee.
8 0
An organization required to register
with the FEC as a "political committee" must
obey multiple campaign finance laws. 81 For
example, political committees must file peri-
odic financial disclosure reports,82 may not di-
rectly accept donations from national banks,
most corporations, or labor unions,8 3 and must
adhere to contribution limits.8 4 Specifically, a
political committee unaffiliated with a political
party or a political candidate may not accept
plaint petitions the court to declare FEC actions
arbitrary and capricious, to "issue an order re-
quiring the Commission ... to define the term
political committee" and to declare that almost
all 527's must register as political committees.90
After filing an amicus brief supporting
Representatives Shays and Meehan in Shays II,
and proposing anti-527 legislation, Senator
Feingold joked, "[slometimes it seems a little
bit like our mission in life is to clean up the
mess that the FEC has made."91 On the other
hand, FEC commissioners may contend that
campaign finance advocates filed Shays II only
because they could not pass legislation explic-
itly making soft money restrictions applicable
to independent 527s.92 The court's decision in
Shays II, and in similar cases, could once again
change the landscape of 527 political advertis-
ing.
Whether or not lawsuits like Shays II are
successful, television stations will probably con-
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
FILM &TV
tinue to benefit from an increase in political ad-
vertising revenue during elections. However,
the manner in which campaign finance laws
are applied to 527's could have a dramatic ef-
fect on the type of groups that will fund future
political television advertising, which in turn
could determine the nature of the commercials.
If lawsuits like Shays II are successful,
they could have one of two effects on television
advertising. The courts could restrict 527's,
causing the flood of independent television ad-
vertising money to slow to a trickle. However,
it is more likely that a such a court decision
would merely cause the flood of independent
money to be rerouted through other channels.9
On the other hand, if suits like Shays II
are unsuccessful, and Congress does not pass
new 527 legislation, the amount of money tele-
vision stations receive from independent 527
advertisements will probably skyrocket.94 527's
will "multiply like the proverbial heads of [the]
hydra" growing in strength and number "far
beyond their original pioneer[s]" of 2004.
9
5
Furthermore, because campaigns usually don't
have the time to fight inaccurate political ads
in court, candidates will have to spend more
and more time and money responding to dam-
aging 527 ads with commercials of their own,
further changing the nature of political adver-
tising.
1I1. The Current, High-Stakes 527
War
Because of the dramatic effect that cases
like Shays II and proposed 527 legislation could
have on the nature of future political advertis-
ing, television stations and Washington insid-
ers are following the 527 battle closely. When
sifting through the legal issues in lawsuits such
as Shays II, courts may first consider whether
Congress intended to apply soft money prohi-
bitions, such as those found in the BCRA, to
independent 527 groups. Second, courts may
have to determine whether, under McConnell
and other decisions, 527 groups' ability to ac-
cept and use soft-money contributions is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Third, if pro-
posed 527 legislation is enacted, courts will
probably consider whether campaign-finance
restrictions on independent organizations serve
a compelling governmental interest, or whether
politicians merely intend to censor political
speech with which they disagree. Finally, courts
may consider whether closing the 527 loophole
will merely expose another loophole and en-
courage even less responsible political adver-
tising by channeling money through even less-
regulated avenues.
A. Congressional Intent
The persuasive attorneys who filed the
Shays II complaint make a compelling, although
somewhat hyper-technical, argument. Perhaps
the Shays II argument (which strings together
pieces of several disassociated statutes and court
decisions) can best be summarized as a logical
syllogism. First, 527's are, by their own admis-
sion, "organized and operated primarily for the
purpose" of influencing elections or political
appointments.96 Second, influencing elections
or political appointments can be classified as a
campaign activity.97 Third, if a group's "major
purpose" is a campaign activity, it is a political
committee. 98 Fourth, all political committees
must register with the FEC and abide by soft
money regulations.99  Therefore, all 527's
should be required to abide soft money restric-
tions. The FEC, however, does not integrate
Buckley's "major purpose test" into its defini-
tion of political committee, and thus does not
necessarily accept the third premise.100 Instead,
the FEC analyzes each 527 group on a case-by-
case basis, and considers a group's purpose as
only one factor in determining whether that
group should be required to register as a politi-
cal committee. 101
It may appear contradictory for 527's to
claim tax-exempt status by asserting they are
"influencing or attempting to influence" elec-
tions,1 2 and then fail to register with the FEC
as political committees. One might initially
think that the FEC acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously by not explicitly requiring all 527 groups
to register as political committees. However,
upon closer inspection, the complaint may take
an unreasonably narrow view of the issue. For
example, the complaint may incorrectly assume
that Congress intended to make independent
527's subject to soft money regulations when
nothing in Title I of the BCRA itself supports
such an assumption."3
FEC Commissioner Ellen Weintraub
argues that requiring all 527's to register as po-
Summer 2005
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litical committees would go against legislative
intent."4 She pointed out that, in 2000, Con-
gress "looked at the issue of 527s," considered
requiring 527's to report to the FEC, then "re-
jected" the idea, and "instead decided to have
them report to the IRS."10 5 If lawmakers
wanted the FEC to hold 527's accountable for
campaign finance violations, she argued, Con-
gress would have specifically required the
groups to report to the FEC, rather than an
agency unauthorized to enforce federal cam-
paign laws.
10 6
Similarly, FEC Chairman Brad Smith,
while testifying before the Senate Rules Com-
mittee, argued that requiring all 527's to regis-
ter as political committees would vastly expand
the number and scope of organizations regu-
lated by the FEC, contrary to the intent Con-
gress had when it enacted campaign finance
laws. 10 7 While testifying before the Senate Rules
Committee, Smith pointed out that classifying
all 527's as political committees would have
been "the most far-reaching expansion of regu-
lation in this area since the 1974 amendments
to the Federal Election Campaign Act, and far
more expansive than the Bipartisan Campaign
Feingold, Shays, and Meehan would now like
to extend the BCRA to prohibit 527"s from ac-
cepting soft money donations, their campaign
finance views are clearly more progressive than
the views of most other members of Congress.
The BCRA was a culmination of a hard-fought,
seven-year effort led by the four Congress-
men."' The legislation was revised, changed,
amended and reintroduced numerous times
before Congress passed it. 12 The text of the
BCRA provides more of a window into Con-
gressional intent than does hindsight allega-
tions of four of the most adamant campaign
finance reform advocates in Congress. The
plain language of the act itself clearly suggests
that Congress intended Title I only to apply to
federal candidates, national parties, and politi-
cal committees who coordinate with such can-
didates or parties.
113
Congress intended Title I of the BCRA
to stop soft money from flowing through na-
tional parties, not independent organizations.
1 4
In McConnell, the Supreme Court explains that
soft money restrictions found in Title I of the
BCRA came about as a congressional attempt
to prohibit "national parties and their agents"
"... the FEC analyzes each 527 group on a
case-by-case basis, and considers a group's
purpose as only one factor in
determining whether that group should
be required to register as a political
committee"
Finance Reform Act itself."10 8 Mr. Smith ex-
plained to "expedient partisans on the right"
who, at the time, advocated regulating groups
like MoveOn.org, that doing so would have also
"crushed" conservative groups such as the Col-
lege Republicans, the Young Republicans, and
the Republican National Lawyers Association. 109
When enacting the BCRA, he argued, neither
Congress nor the public intended to restrict
such groups' ability to advocate a political view-
point."
Even if Congressmen McCain,
from trafficking in soft money."5 Certainly, the
text of the Act does not suggest that Congress
as a whole intended to subject independent po-
litical groups, not coordinating with national
parties, to soft money prohibitions. 1 6 In fact,
if anything, the BCRA has been interpreted to
suggest that Congress did not intend to ham-
per truly independent political organizations
with soft-money prohibitions117 (although Con-
gress did intend to subject independent groups
to disclosure requirements and advertising con-
tent restrictions.)"
8
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Smith also argues that if the federal gov-
ernment chooses to expand campaign finance
laws to gag 527's, Congress, and not an
unelected bureaucracy, should do so.119 Late
last year Senators McCain, Feingold, Schumer,
and Lieberman introduced legislation designed
to smother 527's.120 The bills would force the
FEC to incorporate the "major purpose test"
into its definition of a political committee, which
would compel almost all 527's register with the
FEC and abide by campaign finance laws.121
Congress, therefore, is currently considering
legislation regarding the exact question the
court is asked to address in Shays 11.122 Courts
considering whether to force unelected FEC
commissioners to take action that would sig-
nificantly expand campaign finance regulation
should take into account that Congress itself
will clearly declare its intent by either taking or
not taking the same action.
B. "Special" First-Amendment
Protection
If the proposed legislation 23 that is in-
tended to quash 527 groups becomes law, it
will inevitably have to survive a constitutional
Individuals who pool their money and
purchase television commercials espousing a
political position are exercising their First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
political association. 24 Of course, in McConnell
the Supreme Court recognized that these First
Amendment rights could be restricted to pre-
vent corruption. 25 When upholding the por-
tion of the BCRA that regulates soft money, the
McConnell court justified the political speech
restrictions that the provision placed on national
parties, candidates, federal office holders, and
groups that "coordinate" with candidate or par-
ties. 26 The Court reasoned that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest to avoid cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption that
results when political candidates accept large
donations and then reward contributors by
promoting legislation that benefits donors.
127
However, "at some point, the anti-cor-
ruption rationale runs out, and the constitu-
tional rights of the speaker take over."128 Avoid-
ing corruption or the appearance of corruption
cannot justify congressional or presidential at-
tempts to silence independent political groups
who do not coordinate activities with national
"Congress intended Title I of the
BCRA to stop soft money from
flowing through national parties,
not independent organizations'
challenge. If such a challenge ever makes its way
to the Supreme Court, whether the law survives
may depend on whether the Court thinks that
the anti-corruption arguments expressed in
McConnell should be extended to apply to inde-
pendent 527 groups. The Court could decide
that prohibiting independent groups from ac-
cepting large soft money donations would sig-
nificantly restrict political speech, and that gov-
ernment doesn't have a compelling anti-corrup-
tion interest to silence groups that do not coor-
dinate with elected officials or national parties.
parties and have no power to reward donors
with political favors.12 9  Groups trying to
stretch McConnell's reasoning to justify prohib-
iting 527 groups from using soft money to ad-
vertise encourage the "legalized demolition of
the First Amendment."
130
Even without forcing 527's to register
as political committees, the groups' ability to
engage in political speech is already significantly
restricted because of cumbersome reporting
and disclosure laws.31 Mr. Smith points out
that groups "who criticize or praise the voting
Summer 2005 4V2
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records of their elected representatives have less
Constitutional protection than pornographers,
tobacco advertisers, Klan members who burn
crosses outside black churches, flag burners,
or topless dancers." 3 2 Smith also asserted that
saddling independent 527's with campaign fi-
nance regulation stifles political discourse and
is "not mandated by either BCRA or the Su-
preme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC."
133
Language in McConnell's majority opin-
ion seems to validate Commissioner Smith's
argument that the court did not interpret FECA
§ 323(a) (as amended by the BCRA) to apply to
independent political groups unaffiliated with
national parties.34 In fact, one can even make
a strong argument that McConnell affords spe-
cial constitutional protection to such indepen-
dent groups.
135
In a 5-4 portion of its opinion address-
ing soft-money BCRA restrictions, the
McConnell majority emphasized the
government's long-recognized interest in regu-
lating expenditures "controlled by or coordinated
with the candidate as contributions." 136 But
when explaining its Buckley decision the Court
explicitly stated, "we were not persuaded that
independent expenditures posed the same risk
of real or apparent corruption as coordinated
expenditures."
137
The McConnell Court differentiated be-
tween independent expenditures, which are
entitled to "special protection," and coordinated
expenditures, which are regulated by campaign
finance laws. 138 "We repeatedly have struck
down limitations on expenditures 'made totally
independently of the candidate and his cam-
paign,"' the majority opinion explained, "on the
ground that such limitations 'impose far greater
restraints on the freedom of speech and asso-
ciation' than do limits on contributions and
coordinated expenditures." 139 The majority
reasoned that "[i]ndependent expenditures 'are
poor sources of leverage for a spender because
they might be duplicative or counterproduc-
tive from a candidate's point of view."' 140 The
Court went on to differentiate coordinated ex-
penditures from independent donations by
ruling that the former are "made 'at the request
or suggestion of' a candidate."14'
Thus, 527 groups operating indepen-
dent of political parties should be entitled to
the special free-speech protection as long as fed-
eral candidates do not request that contributors
donate money to 527's, solicit money from the
groups, or give money to 527's. 142 This author
finds no credible evidence that, during the 2004
campaign, either President Bush or Senator
Kerry specifically suggested that wealthy donors
give money to groups like SBVFT or
MoveOn.org, or that Federal Candidates encour-
aged such 527's to make specific expenditures.
Furthermore, this author finds no credible evi-
dence of national parties transferring funds to
527's, or vice versa. Regardless of whether or
not independent 527's engaging in political
speech should receive special First Amendment
protection, certainly McConnell doesn't require
the FEC to prohibit groups unaffiliated with
candidates or national parties from accepting
soft money.1
4'
C. Principled Debate or Power
Struggle?
The courts may ultimately have to de-
cide whether politicians trying to hush 527's
intend to rid politics of soft-money corruption,
or whether they merely seek to quash political
opposition and increase the probability that
they or their fellow party members will be re-
elected. Muzzling independent political groups
may advantage incumbents by enabling them
to streamline and control issues discussed in
campaigns and magnify their fundraising and
name recognition advantages. Moreover, many
politicians who quickly shift their positions and
rhetoric on the 527 debate as political winds
change give the impression that they are more
concerned with silencing vocal opposition than
with eliminating political corruption.
Some, like Justice Kennedy, viewed
BCRA soft-money restrictions as an unconsti-
tutional effort by elected officials to silence crit-
ics and enhance their reelection chances.
144
Justice Kennedy's dissenting McConnell opin-
ion characterized Title I of the BCRA as "an in-
cumbency protection plan."145 The dissenting
opinion cites James E. Miller who argues, in
part, that regulations restricting the free-flow
of political ideas during a federal election ben-
efit the incumbent.
146
Miller's argument is even more compel-
ling when free speech restrictions are extended
to independent 527's that do not coordinate
activities or expenditures with any national
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party. Taking independent 527 groups out of
the political picture could increase the media's
role in controlling the main issues in congres-
sional campaigns. This would give incumbents
a huge advantage given that they can more eas-
ily call high-profile press conferences and have
tax-funded staffs and press spokespersons help-
ing them 'stir-up' and spin issues.147 Further-
more, hushing 527's may allow incumbents (es-
pecially those in mid-sized and small media
markets) to more easily control political topics
their local news agencies discuss because of their
access to inside information and involvement
in political issues attracting media attention.
148
Restricting the ability of independent
527 groups to put issues at the forefront of a
campaign also gives incumbents even greater
control over political discourse through adver-
tising. Typically, incumbents enjoy a
fundraising advantage enabling them to pur-
chase more commercials and to produce higher
quality commercials. 149 Furthermore, incum-
bents can "carry over [money] from election to
election," continually adding to their campaign
war chests and then using excess money only
when their positions are in real jeopardy because
Democrat and Republican, behave more like
self-interested actors trying to control what oth-
ers say about them than sincere public servants
striving to limit political corruption. Certainly
some politicians, like Senators McCain and
Feingold, are deeply concerned about govern-
ment corruption resulting from what they per-
ceive to be excessive amounts of soft money
injected into the political process. However,
many other politicians seem to support regu-
lating 527 groups only when it appears that
doing so will help their parties or help their re-
election chances. The 527 controversy sur-
rounding the 2004 election illustrates this point.
Democrats got off to an early start in
the 527 race, while Republicans were the first
to complain. In early 2004, several democrat-
leaning 527 organizations flooded the Internet
and television airwaves with pro-democrat (or
more accurately, anti-Bush) advertisements. 53
MoveOn.org, for example, featured ads calling
Bush a Nazi. 54 Subsequently, the Republican
National Committee sent a letter to 250 televi-
sion stations urging managers not to run
MoveOn.org advertisements. 155 The letter
opined that broadcasters had a responsibility to
"Taking independent 527 groups
out of the political picture could
increase the media's role in
controlling the main issues in
congressional campaigns"
of a strong challenge. 5 ° By diminishing 527
groups' control over election discourse, incum-
bents magnify their fundraising advantage be-
cause their commercials, and not independent
groups, frame campaign issues.'51 Also, silenc-
ing independent 527's may enable incumbents
to more easily ride the wave of name recogni-
tion to reelection by avoiding issues and attacks
the independent groups would otherwise
raise. 15
2
Moreover, close examination of the 527
debate suggests that most politicians, both
"refrain from complicity in any illegal ...viola-
tions of our nation's Federal Election Laws."
156
Furthermore, the RNC and the Bush-Cheney
campaign jointly filed a complaint with the FEC
alleging that certain 527's were violating cam-
paign finance laws.157
About two months later, when the FEC
failed to take aggressive action to stop Demo-
crat-leaning 527s, Republicans vehemently pre-
dicted a politically-bloody 527 advertising Ar-
mageddon. 158 Bush-Cheney Campaign Chair-
man Marc Racicot and RNC Chairman Ed
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Gillespie issued a joint statement calling FEC
inaction "irresponsible," and claiming it would
lead to "a total meltdown of federal campaign
finance regulation in 2004."'- 9 The duo fur-
ther warned that the Commission gave conser-
vative 527's the "green light" to "forge full steam
ahead" with controversial ads of their own.
160
The two leading Republicans predicted that a
"soft money arms race for the 2004 election"1 61
would escalate into "a full scale, two-sided war,"
which they predicted would "rage unabated
through Election Day."
162
However, the party whose members
were expressing almost universal, emphatic
indignation over perceived loose enforcement
of soft-money restrictions is the same party that,
for years, stood in the way of campaign finance
reform bills like McCain-Feingold, which pro-
posed harsher soft money regulations.163 Re-
publican senators on the Rules Committee even
initiated investigative hearings and sharply rep-
rimanded the FEC because the agency failed to
quickly "enforce" campaign finance laws by
silencing 527's.164 However, only three years
earlier many of the same Republican Senators
adamantly led the fight opposing (and voted
against) the BCRA.'1 Moreover, approximately
18% of members of Congress voting to pass
the "Bipartisan" Campaign Reform Act were
Republicans. 66
During the first half of 2004, pro-Demo-
crat 527's enjoyed a huge financial advantage.
By June 29, 2004, left-leaning 527 groups had
raised approximately $80 million compared to
only $8 Million raised by conservative 527
groups. 6 7 As Democrat-leaning 527's used tele-
vision commercials to pound their messages
into the public psyche, Bush's approval ratings
dipped.168 Senator Kerry rode the 527 ads to a
mid-summer lead over President Bush.
6 9
Democrat politicians were noticeably silent
about the increased role the groups were play-
ing in the presidential elections. If Senator Kerry
objected to the fringe 527 groups such as
MoveOn.org making arguably false accusa-
tions 170 or using soft money, we didn't hear
about it. Democrats seemed to shift from
strongly supporting legislation based on the
premise that soft money should be eliminated
from politics to quietly approving of Democrat-
leaning, soft-money-funded 527's.' 71 The
Democrat presidential hopeful touted his vet-
eran credentials and eagerly invited a debate on
national security leadership, repeatedly chal-
lenging Republicans to "bring it on." 172
Well, SBVFT "brought it on" 173 and the
527 tide began to turn. In August, the conser-
vative 527 unleashed a TV ad claiming Kerry
lied about his Vietnam service record, his first
purple heart, and his bronze star.174 The Kerry
Campaign filed an action with the FEC alleg-
ing that the controversial SBVFT ads were ille-
gal. 175 Attorneys for the Kerry Campaign and
the Democratic National Committee jointly
wrote a letter to television station managers
urging them not to play the advertisement.176
Additionally, Senator Kerry challenged Presi-
dent Bush to denounce the SBVFT ad.177 Presi-
dent Bush responded by advocating an imme-
diate end to all 527 soft-money ads. 178
Many politicians (as well as the two
main national parties) seem to change their
positions on 527 regulation depending on
whether they believe restricting the groups will
help or hurt them. Such actions appear to cloak
political self-interest in the robes of eliminating
corruption and making politics more civil. The
courts will have to decide whether to go along
with the charade.
D. The Shell Game
When deciding cases such as Shays II,
courts may attempt to determine whether pro-
hibiting all 527's from accepting large soft
money donations would help advance the goals
Congress articulated when passing the BCRA.
Many McCain-Feingold proponents assumed
that taking soft money away from candidates
and political parties and requiring candidates
to approve their messages would increase civil-
ity and truth in political campaigns. 1 79 Instead,
the legislation had the opposite effect. The Act
"push[ed] the money upstream," making can-
didates less responsible, rather than more re-
sponsible for the content of political advertis-
ing.18° For example, President Bush and Sena-
tor Kerry were able to deny having anything to
do with nasty SBVFT and MoveOn.org ads,
while still benefiting from them. Some argue
that the further and further political money is
pushed from candidates, the less and less civil
and truthful political advertising will become.181
If courts force the FEC to prohibit 527's
from accepting soft money, large donations may
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be rerouted to "stealth PACs" such as 501c
groups-named for the section of the tax code
under which they are organized.182 Currently,
most 501c groups (such as the NRA, NAACP,
and U.S. Chamber of Commerce) focus on
advancing the political interests of a particular
segment of the population. Unlike 527's, 501c
groups are not required to reveal the identities
of their donors or disclose their expenditures.
18 3
Although 501c organizations are required to
jump through their own regulatory hoops,
184
some allege that politically active 501c groups
regularly violate campaign finance laws appli-
cable to them.185 For example, some politically
motivated 501c groups may disguise them-
selves as social welfare organizations to avoid
527 disclosure laws. 18 6 It is impossible to tell
how much 501c groups spent on the 2004 elec-
tions because the groups are generally secre-
tive about how they spend money.187 However,
the amount is estimated between $70 and $100
million. 
188
The political influence 501c organizations
wield would certainly increase exponentially if
a court decision pushed money even further
upstream8 9 from 527's to 501c groups. Conse-
that several SBVFT donors were staunch Bush
supporters with questionable motives.
193 If
SBVFT had been set up as a 501c group, Mr.
Kerry would have had even less of a shield to
defend himself against the ads.
IV. Fight 527 Speech With More
Political Speech, Not With Censor-
ship
194
Courts analyzing cases such as Shays II
should defer to the FEC's regulation defining
the term "political committee." Courts may,
understandably, disagree with the commission's
definition. However, campaign finance laws
charge the FEC, and not the courts, with en-
forcing soft-money laws. 195 Generally, courts
should yield to agency regulations unless the
regulations are "arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to [a] statute."'96 FEC commis-
sioners have a reasonable basis to believe that
Congress as a whole did not intend to mandate
expansive 527 regulation when passing cam-
paign finance legislation. 197 Furthermore,
agency commissioners reasonably believe that
McConnell does not require truly independent 8
"Rather than try to censor 527 speech,
the government and the courts should
stay out of the way and let candidates
or other independent groups fight 4
questionable 527 speech with more
speech."
quently, closing the perceived 527 loophole
would force money from a relatively transpar-
ent scheme to more stealth groups, encourag-
ing even less accountability. 90 Unlike 501c
groups, 527's must disclose contributions and
expenditures that exceed certain limits, or face
a tax. 191 Consequently, the Kerry campaign
knew who funded SBVFT, who directed and
managed it, and how much the group spent
prior to the 2004 presidential election.9 2 As a
result, the Kerry campaign was able to ques-
tion the authenticity of the ads and point out
527 groups to register as political committees. 99
Proposed legislation designed to hush
independent 527 organizations may infringe on
the independent groups' free speech and po-
litical association rights. American voters, not
the government, have traditionally determined
whether particular political speech has merit.
Although the McConnell Court justified impos-
ing soft money restrictions on political parties,
candidates, and groups who coordinate with
candidates or parties, the decision also reiter-
ated the Court's long standing commitment to
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shield "truly independent" groups from politi-
cal censorship.200 Allowing career politicians
to control political discourse by shutting down
527's creates a huge incentive for those politi-
cians to trample on the First-Amendment rights
of independent political groups. Many politi-
cians zealously advocating 527 soft money re-
strictions seem more like self-interested actors
trying to censor political opposition (in viola-
tion of the First Amendment) than principled
officials seeking to eliminate government cor-
ruption.
Moreover, extending campaign finance
laws to muzzle 527's will only expose another
loophole, and make political advertising even
less civil and less transparent. As long as televi-
sion advertising remains effective, and as long
as political parties and candidates are prohib-
ited from accepting large soft money contribu-
tions, the amount of money spent on political
television advertising by independent groups
will continue to increase during future election
cycles. If Congress or the courts dam the 527
channel, campaign money will find another
outlet, perhaps through even more stealth
groups such as 501c's.
Using the heavy boot of campaign fi-
nance laws to suppress 527 speech could stifle
the American tradition of robust political de-
bate and a free flow of political ideas. Rather
than try to censor 527 speech,2 1 the govern-
ment and the courts should stay out of the way
and let candidates or other independent groups
fight questionable 527 speech with more
speech.20 2 Prohibiting independent 527's from
using soft money is America's next step down
the same road that many European countries
have followed: requiring complete public fund-
ing of campaigns.2 3 Although some campaign
finance reform advocates use the recent 527
debate to argue in support of publicly-funded
elections, 20 4 "[t]he European experience has
shown that taking the money out of politics can
also mean taking the politics out of politics."
20 5
Giving political parties even more control over
which campaign issues are discussed would
tranquilize the robust political debate upon
which American elections have historically been
built.
20 6
In conclusion, the ultimate resolution of
the current 527 war could significantly affect the
nature of future political television advertising.
In light of both the plain language of the BCRA
and the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell,
the FEC did not act arbitrarily and capriciously
by failing to incorporate the "major purpose"
test into its definition of the term "political com-
mittee."2 7 Additionally, the Supreme Court's
anti-corruption rationale used to uphold Title I
of the BCRA may not apply to political efforts
intended to make independent political organi-
zations subject to soft money restrictions. More-
over, politicians who attempt to regulate 527's
may do so in order to silence political opposi-
tion, increase their reelection chances, or help
their party, rather than to limit political corrup-
tion. Also, if Congress or the courts were to close
the 527 loophole, large contributions would
probably flow through even more stealth groups
such as 501c organizations. Silencing 527's by
forcing the FEC to define them as "political com-
mittees" would "gut the First Amendment" 208
without effectively regulating campaign finance.
Politicians should fight disingenuous 527 speech
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